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Abstract:  It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of 
beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to 
indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming 
that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that  
one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such 
as  responding  correctly  to  epistemic  reasons  that  agents  have  are  not  genuine  rationality 
requirements. This result doesn’t square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning 
epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent 
can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons.  This provides a partial solution to the 
above puzzle.
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Meet  Doctor  Watson,  Sherlock Holmes's  assistant.  While  he rarely  matches  Holmes’s 
reasoning skills, Watson is an epistemically rational reasoner.1 Now, imagine that Watson finds 
himself in the following situations:
Clear Evidence. Watson has sufficient evidence of numerous distinctive features X (the type of 
murder, the type of victim, the crime scene’s location, etc.). Given features X, it seems highly 
probable to Watson that the killer is Jack the Ripper.
Fallible Reasons. Watson analyzes numerous distinctive features X (the type of murder, the type 
of  victim,  the  crime  scene’s  location,  etc.).  He  finds  a  justificatory  chain  leading  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  killer  is  Jack  the  Ripper.  However,  he  is  aware  that  the  reasons  he 
responded to are fallible to a certain degree.
Bad Reasoning. Watson concludes that the killer is Jack the Ripper on the basis of numerous 
distinctive features X (the type of murder, the type of victim, the crime scene’s location, etc.). 
However, he also has evidence (i) that Holmes thinks that he (Watson) made a mistake in 
processing the evidence and (ii) that Holmes is almost always reliable. For example, Holmes 
could suggest that, on that particular occasion, Watson reached a conclusion through incorrect 
reasoning.
Let’s assume that, in cases like Clear Evidence, Watson is epistemically rational in concluding 
that Jack the Ripper is the killer. However, in cases like Bad Reasoning or Fallible Reasons, 
1 I borrowed these “Watson cases” from Coates (2012) and Horowitz (2014a).
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things  get  complicated.  In  such  cases,  it  isn’t  clear  how  Watson  will  rationally  weight  the 
evidence he has or evaluate his own reasoning.
Several  authors  have recently suggested that,  in  cases like Bad Reasoning or  Fallible 
Reasons,  it  is  rational  for  Watson to  hold  an akratic  combination  of  attitudes  (Coates  2012; 
Lasonen-Aarnio 2014;  Lasonen-Aarnio m.s.).  Others have suggested that such cases show that 
responding to epistemic reasons is not a genuine requirement of epistemic rationality, or at least 
that responding to epistemic reasons can conflict with coherence requirements  (Worsnip 2015). 
Let’s call this a Rational Puzzle:
Rational Puzzle. At least one of the following verdicts is correct: (i) epistemic akrasia can be 
rational,  or  (ii)  requirements  such  as  responding  correctly  to  epistemic  reasons  are  not 
genuine rationality requirements.
Rational  Puzzle  is  problematic  because  it  does  not  cope  well  with  plausible  assumptions 
concerning epistemic rationality. In particular, it is hard to imagine that an epistemically rational 
agent  sometimes  has  to  choose  between  responding  correctly  to  his  or  her  reasons  and 
maintaining internal coherence. 
In this paper, I shed light on the above puzzle. First, it is sometimes helpful to determine 
that what appears to be a new problem is, in fact, very similar to a well-known one. I will suggest 
that Rational Puzzle is essentially related to traditional problems of responding to fallible reasons 
such as the lottery paradox. Specifically, if the fallibilist solution to the lottery paradox is correct, 
then it could be rational for an agent to hold an akratic combination of attitudes. Nevertheless, I  
will suggest that an agent never has to choose between responding to his or her reasons and 
avoiding akratic combinations of attitudes, because he or she is always in a position to satisfy 
both.
In section 1, I will clarify what I mean by requirements of rationality, epistemic reasons 
and the enkratic requirements. I will also present Rational Puzzle and explain why cases like Bad 
Reasoning or Fallible Reasons are closely related to this puzzle. In section 2, I will argue that 
Rational Puzzle holds only if a rational agent can have sufficient epistemic reason to believe that 
“he or she has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P,” while having sufficient epistemic reason 
against  believing P.  I  will  then explain  that  such situations  are  possible  only  if  higher-order 
epistemic reasons are sometimes fallible. 
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This will lead me, in section 3, to analyze the possibility of fallible higher-order epistemic 
reasons. I will argue that, while there can be fallible higher-order epistemic reasons, an agent can 
always respond to  infallible  higher-order  epistemic  reasons.  Furthermore,  relative  to  rational 
reasoning, responding to infallible higher-order epistemic reasons appears to be preferable. In 
other words, I will argue that a rational agent would prefer responding to infallible higher-order 
reasons. This provides a partial solution to Rational Puzzle: while this paper does not rule out the 
possibility of rational epistemic akrasia, (i) no epistemically rational agent is required to maintain 
such a combination of attitudes and (ii) remaining in such a state seems undesirable.
1. Rational Believers, Enkratic Requirement(s) and Rational Puzzle
1.1. Rational Believers and Epistemic Reasons
An ideally rational agent satisfies all  state and process rationality requirements.2 State 
requirements govern  relations among multiple attitudes. They are, for the most part, coherence 
requirements. Here are two putative coherence requirements of rationality:3
Consistency. Rationality requires that, if A believes that P, then it is false that A believes that ~P.
Intra-Level Coherence. Rationality requires that, if A believes that P1, believes that P2, ... and 
believes that Pn, then it is false that A believes that ~(P1^P2 ... ^Pn).
Consistency is logically weaker than Intra-Level Coherence. For example, simultaneously 
believing  P,  believing  Q  and  believing  ~(P^Q)  violates  Intra-Level  Coherence  but  such  a 
combination of beliefs does not necessarily violates Consistency. For the moment, I will only 
assume that Consistency is correct, and I will come back to Intra-Level Coherence in section 3 
when discussing lottery cases.
Process requirements govern how agents form and revise their attitudes over time. For 
example, when an agent has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P, this seems to put him or her 
under a normative pressure to come to believe P, as in the following:
Reasons-Responsiveness. Rationality  requires  that,  if  A has  sufficient  epistemic  reason  to 
believe P, A believes that P.
2 Some authors have suggested that there are no distinct state requirements of rationality. Specifically, process 
requirements of rationality, which govern how rational agents form and revise beliefs, could secure putative state 
requirements such as Consistency (Kolodny 2007). I do not wish to address that debate here.
3 See notably Broome (2005, 322; 2007a, 355; 2013, sec. 9.2). 
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In Reasons-Responsiveness, the notions of sufficiency and reasons remain to be clarified. 
First, sufficiency. Some authors prefer to say that agents ought to respond to conclusive reasons. 
A conclusive epistemic reason to believe P puts agents under a normative pressure to believe P. I 
prefer the notion of sufficient epistemic reason, since conclusiveness is sometimes assumed to be 
infallible.  If  conclusive  reasons  are  infallible,  then  having  conclusive  reason to  believe  P is 
incompatible with P’s being false. Since this is not what I have in mind, I prefer to avoid using 
the notion of conclusive reason (but if conclusive reasons can be fallible, one could replace my 
“sufficient epistemic reason” with “conclusive epistemic reason”).
Now, reasons.  There are many substantial debates surrounding the nature of epistemic 
reasons that I do not wish to address here. For instance, I will not take a stand in the objectivism-
perspectivism debate on reasons. According to objectivism, what you have sufficient reason for 
believing depends on the facts of your situation. Perspectivists consider that your perspective 
(what  you are in  a  position to  know, what  appears  true  from your standpoint,  and so forth) 
explains what reasons are. 
However, we can remain neutral on these substantial issues surrounding reasons while 
representing  them in  a  particular  way.  With  respect  to  the  project  of  this  paper,  offering  a 
representation of the distinction between fallible and infallible reasons is very important. Fallible 
reasons  to  believe  P are  reasons  compatible  with  P’s  being  false  or  reasons  that  could  be 
misleading concerning P (Moretti and Piazza 2013, sec. 3.2). 
Reasons can be represented through possibility theory, subjective levels of confidence, 
probabilities, ranking theory and so forth.4 In this paper, I will limit my argument and examples 
to a probabilistic representation of reasons. Specifically, I will assume that epistemic reasons are 
represented by  epistemic probabilities, understood as the probabilities warranted by an agent’s 
body of epistemic reasons. In such a context, fallible reasons to believe P warrant an epistemic 
probability of less than 1 in P, and infallible reasons to believe P warrant an epistemic probability  
of 1 in P. Also, while rational credences are  not identical to epistemic probabilities, they  track 
epistemic probabilities.  For example,  if  P’s epistemic probability is  0.9 relative to  a body of 
4 See, for example, Foley (2009), Dubois and Prade (2009) and Spohn (2009).
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epistemic reasons,  then it is rational for an agent who has such a body of epistemic reasons to 
entertain a credence of 0.9 in P.
The probabilistic  representation of  reasons raises  methodological  difficulties.  It  is  not 
always clear how we should represent perceptual learning, defeaters and undermining evidence in 
a probabilistic framework (Christensen 1992; Pryor 2013; Weisberg 2015). While we should take 
these difficulties seriously, there are two reasons why I maintain a probabilistic representation of 
reasons. First,  as we will  see in section 3, some authors defending rational epistemic akrasia 
make use of a probabilistic representation of fallible reasons.5 Since my goal is to address other 
arguments found in the literature, it seems justified to make use of the probabilistic representation 
of reasons. Second, even if the probabilistic representation of reasons is limited and problematic, 
understanding the  type  of  results  we can  get  in  this  framework could  eventually  help  us  to 
develop  similar  arguments  in  other  frameworks.  So,  even  if  this  is  not  the  most  adequate 
representation  of  reasons,  it  is  worth  considering  what  results  we  reach  through  such  a 
representation.
1.2. Formulating the Enkratic Requirement(s)
Akratic agents seem to be irrational. Many people have suggested that akrasia reveals 
inter-level incoherence—that is, incoherence between an agent’s first and higher-order attitudes.6 
The “anti-akrasia constraint” can be defined as follows:
5 For instance, Lasonen-Aarnio indicates that “a doxastic state in a proposition p is epistemically permitted if and 
only if it tracks the probability of p on one’s evidence, or the evidential probability of p” (Lasonen-Aarnio m.s.,  
2).
6 Alexander (2013) suggests that, when agents have a higher-order doubt about P, they should not take a higher-
order attitude towards P. Broome  (2013, 22–23, 170–71) roughly suggests that, in practical  cases, failure to 
conform to the Enkratic requirement is an internal failure, a failure with respect to your own deliberation and 
standards. However, he suggests that the epistemic version of Enkrasia brings more difficulties (Broome 2013,  
170-72, 216-19). Greco (2014) argues that epistemic akrasia leads to a kind of fragmentation or irrational inner 
conflict.  Hinchman  (2013) defends the claim that  epistemically akratic agents end up in a situation of self-
mistrust. According to Horowitz  (2014a), epistemically akratic combinations of attitudes lead to patently bad 
reasoning. Reisner  (2013) suggests that, while the enkratic requirement is not a rationality requirement, it  is 
strongly connected with agentivity. According to Titelbaum, mistakes concerning rationality requirements are 
necessarily irrational, which implies that “no situation rationally permits any overall state containing both an  
attitude  A and the  belief  that  A is  rationally  forbidden in one’s  current  situation”  (2015,  261).  Titelbaum’s 
argument is premised on the assumption that  akrasia is  irrational.  See also Littlejohn  (2015),  who endorses 
Titelbaum’s view and adds that inter-level incoherence is the sign of an opaque mindset.
Finally,  many philosophers defend the claim that  akrasia is  similar to Moore-paradoxical  doxastic  states—some 
deeply incoherent combinations of attitudes. See notably Chislenko (2014), Feldman (2005), Huemer (2007) and 
Smithies (2012).
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Reasons Enkrasia. Rationality requires that (if A believes that he or she has sufficient epistemic  
reason to believe P, then A believes that P).
However, we find many variants of this thesis in the literature, as in the following:7
Evidence Enkrasia. Rationality requires that (if A believes that his or her evidence sufficiently  
supports the belief that P, then A believes that P).
Ought Enkrasia. Rationality requires that (if A believes that he or she ought to believe that P, 
then A believes that P).
Justification Enkrasia. Rationality requires that (if A believes that he or she is  epistemically 
justified in believing that P, then A believes that P).
“Rational” Enkrasia. Rationality requires that (if A believes that rationality requires of him or 
her to believe that P, then A believes that P)
Obviously,  claims  concerning epistemic rationality,  knowledge,  justification,  epistemic 
obligations and evidence are related to epistemic reasons in  some ways. However, we cannot 
assume that all the above claims are equivalent. Since I will not assume that claims concerning 
justification, rationality, obligations, epistemic reasons and evidence are equivalent, I will focus 
on Reasons Enkrasia and leave the other variants behind.8
Historically, philosophers have been concerned with the possibility of holding an akratic 
combination of attitudes.9 More recently, philosophers have focused on the normative issue of 
whether an epistemically akratic combination of attitudes can be rational. These two issues are 
related.  If  agents  cannot  hold  an  akratic  combination  of  attitudes,  determining  whether  an 
7 For example, Horowitz  (2014a) analyzes the converse of Evidence Enkrasia, Broome (2013) considers Ought 
Enkrasia, Feldman (2005) is concerned with both Justification Enkrasia, and Lasonen-Aarnio (2015) addresses 
“Rational” Enkrasia. Also, some putative requirements of rationality like the “RR principle” of the Fixed Point  
thesis are very close to “Rational” Enkrasia. See notably Conee (2010, sec. 3), Lasonen-Aarnio (m.s., sect. II), 
Littlejohn (2015, 5) and Titelbaum (2015).
It should also be noted that many philosophers are concerned with the oddity of combination of attitudes like the 
following: “P, but it is false that my epistemic reasons sufficiently support the conclusion that P” (see Horowitz  
2014 on this case and see Lasonen-Aarnio m.s. for discussion). I am not convinced that this variant of epistemic 
akrasia is necessarily irrational. There could be cases where an epistemically rational agent believes P while 
believing that  his  or  her  epistemic  reasons  do not  sufficiently  support  P.  For example,  one  could be in  an  
epistemically permissive situation where, relative to a body of evidence, incompatible doxastic attitudes towards 
P are rationally permitted (see notably White (2014) and Kelly (2014) on epistemic permissiveness). To avoid 
the debate surrounding permissiveness, the only counterexamples to Reasons Enkrasia I will consider look like 
the following: “I don’t believe that P, but my epistemic reasons sufficiently support the conclusion that P.”
8 This  generates  a  methodological  difficulty,  since  the  enkratic  requirements  discussed  in  the  literature  take  
distinct incompatible forms. Nevertheless, as long as it does not lead to straightforward nonsensical results, I will  
engage with the literature as if other authors had discussed Reasons Enkrasia.
9 See notably Davidson (1982, 302-304), Mele (1988, chap. 2-3), Pears (1984, chap. 9), Ribeiro (2011) and Zheng 
(2001).
– 6 –
epistemically  akratic  combination  of  attitudes  can  be  rational  seems  pointless,  since  such  a 
situation can never happen. In this paper, I will assume that akratic combinations of attitudes are 
possible. I will focus on whether such combinations of attitudes are necessarily irrational.
1.3. The Case for Rational Puzzle
I now wish to explain the case for Rational Puzzle, which is a reconstruction from two 
distinct  positions  that  can be found in the literature.  Since these two stands were developed 
independently from each other, I want to explain why these positions, taken together, constitute a 
puzzle.
First, suppose that there are process requirements of rationality, such as responding to the 
epistemic reasons agents have, and that there is no unsolvable dilemma of rationality. In cases 
like Bad Reasoning, it  could be suggested that one way to respond correctly to the evidence 
agents have is to transgress Reasons Enkrasia. According to Allen Coates, if Holmes tells Watson 
that he is irrational in concluding that Jack the Ripper is the killer, Watson’s rational response to 
such higher-order evidence is to believe that his epistemic reasons (including deductive reasoning 
and evidence) do not support the conclusion that Jack the Ripper is guilty. However, recall that 
there are rational false beliefs. So, perhaps Watson is rational in concluding that Jack the Ripper 
is the killer. In such a case, Watson could be rational in believing that Jack the Ripper is guilty 
and respond correctly to his evidence in concluding that his epistemic reasons do not support that 
conclusion (Coates 2012, 113–15). According to Coates:
Before he spoke to Holmes, Watson’s belief was, by hypothesis, perfectly rational. 
And the only change in his epistemic circumstances is that he has heard Holmes’s 
assessment. So any objection which claims that his belief is irrational must show that 
Holmes’s assessment of it somehow explains why it is irrational (Coates 2012, 115).
Therefore, Watson could be rational in having an akratic combination of attitudes. Now, what 
about the fact that violating Reasons Enkrasia appears deeply incoherent? According to Maria 
Lasonen-Aarnio, when an agent has higher-order evidence concerning his or her own rationality, 
it is not always possible to identify a single coherent combination of attitudes that he or she could 
hold (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014; Lasonen-Aarnio m.s.). For example, she argues that “recommending 
that one believe that a rule is flawed is not tantamount to recommending that one stop following 
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the  rule.  That  one  should  believe  that  one  shouldn’t  φ  doesn’t  entail  that  one  shouldn’t  φ” 
(Lasonen-Aarnio 2014, 343).  In accordance with Coates,  Lasonen-Aarnio concludes that it  is 
sometimes  rational  for  an  agent  to  maintain  incoherent  combinations  of  beliefs,  and thus  to 
transgress Reasons Enkrasia.
Alex Worsnip also agrees that, in some situations, Watson’s evidence can support (i) that 
Jack  the  Ripper  is  the  killer  and  also  support  (ii)  that  his  evidence  does  not  support  that 
conclusion.  What Worsnip rejects  is  that  responding correctly to the evidence agents have is 
rationally  required.  Indeed,  while  Coates  and  Lasonen-Aarnio’s  conclusion  presupposes  that 
responding correctly to the evidence agents have is a requirement of rationality, Worsnip denies 
that if Watson’s evidence supports P, then rationality requires of Watson that he believes that P, 
especially in cases where this means having an incoherent combination of attitudes. According to 
him, evidence-responsiveness and inter-level coherence “are, properly understood, fundamentally 
different kinds of normative claim, such that they should not be stated using the same normative 
concept” (Worsnip 2015, 6). As I indicated in the previous section, for the sake of comparability 
between arguments found in the literature, I’ll reinterpret Worsnip’s claim in terms of epistemic 
reasons.  A  plausible  reinterpretation  of  Worsnip’s  conclusion  is  to  deny  that  Reasons-
Responsiveness necessarily has to do with rationality.10
In summary, it seems that we must accept the puzzle. On the one hand, we can admit that 
Reasons-Responsiveness is a requirement of rationality and that there is no dilemma of epistemic 
rationality, but then we must give up Reasons Enkrasia. On the other hand, we can admit that 
there  is  no  dilemma  of  epistemic  rationality  and  that  Reasons  Enkrasia  is  a  rationality 
requirement,  but  then  we  must  give  up  Reasons-Responsiveness.  Rational  Puzzle  seriously 
affects  how  rationality  is  canonically  understood.  Contra Lasonen-Aarnio  and  Coates,  it  is 
plausible  that  coherence  requirements  are  genuine  requirements  of  rationality,  including 
coherence between an agent’s first and higher-order attitudes.11 Contra Worsnip, it  seems that 
10 Strictly speaking, Worsnip never said such a thing. However, this strikes me as a plausible consequence of his  
view, since he associates coherence with rationality and argues that Reasons-Responsiveness is best captured by 
different  normative  claims.  In  view of  the foregoing,  it  seems that  Reasons-Responsiveness  would be  best  
captured by claims outside the realm of rationality.  Also Worsnip’s view is compatible with the claim that  
Reasons-Responsiveness is a source of normative pressure on agents, but such a normative pressure would not  
come from rationality. See also Worsnip (2016).
11 See Broome (2013, chap. 9) or Gibbons (2013, 229–34). See also note 6.
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epistemic rationality has to do with more than mere coherence. Otherwise, if conspiracy theorists 
and hard-core skeptics are fully coherent, they would also be fully rational, and that doesn’t seem 
correct.12 A priori,  no  position  is  comfortable  or  copes  well  with  other  plausible  theoretical 
assumptions regarding epistemic rationality.13
2. Rational Puzzle and Level-Splitting
In this section, I will argue that Rational Puzzle holds only if an agent can have sufficient 
epistemic reason to believe that “he or she has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P,” while not 
having sufficient epistemic reason to believe P.14 I will refer to these situations as cases of level-
splitting.
A key feature of Rational Puzzle is that Reasons-Responsiveness and Reasons Enkrasia 
sometimes lead to incompatible verdicts. As long as higher-order epistemic reasons are coherent 
with  first-order  epistemic  reasons,  Reasons  Enkrasia  and  Reasons-Responsiveness  are 
compatible. For example, suppose that an agent has sufficient epistemic reason to believe that “he 
or she has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P” and sufficient epistemic reason to believe P. 
In  such a  case,  Reasons-Responsiveness  requires  of  that  agent  to  believe that  he  or  she  has 
sufficient epistemic reason to believe P and to believe P. Such a combination of attitudes satisfies 
Reasons  Enkrasia.  So,  if  an  agent’s  first  and  higher-order  epistemic  reasons  are  coherent, 
Reasons-Responsiveness and Reasons Enkrasia do not lead to incompatible verdicts.
12 See Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016) and Horowitz (2014b). 
13 A third possibility would be to maintain Reasons Enkrasia and Reasons-Responsiveness requirements, but to 
conclude that,  in some situations,  agents will  necessarily defy the ideals of epistemic rationality.  If  Watson 
concludes that he cannot rationally respond to his epistemic reasons, he could withhold judgment on whether 
Jack the Ripper is guilty. However, he has sufficient evidence that Jack the Ripper is the killer, which means that 
he does not respond correctly to the evidence he has. But if he believes that he can rationally respond to his  
epistemic reasons,  Watson  does not  respond correctly  to  Holmes’s  testimony that  he is  currently unable to  
respond to his epistemic reasons. According to David Christensen, in such a case, regardless of how Watson 
respond to his evidence, he could be “doomed to fall short of the rational ideal” (Christensen 2010, 212). Such a 
claim is controversial.  Chang  (2001) and Bélanger  (2011) argue that  all normative dilemmas can be solved. 
Plausibly, if rationality is supposed to offer guidance, or to consistently determine an agent’s permissions and  
obligations,  then every apparent dilemma of rationality should be solvable.  This is  why I here assume that 
putative dilemmas between Reasons Enkrasia and Reasons-Responsiveness are solvable.  On the other hand, 
Sinnott-Armstrong (1996) and Williams (1965) defend the claim that there are unsolvable normative dilemmas.
14 Lasonen-Aarnio (m.s.), Worsnip (2015) and Horowitz (2014a) reach similar conclusions.
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2.1. Level-Splitting and Incommensurability
I see two possible explanations of why, in some situations, first-order reasons and higher-
order reasons come apart. The first explanation is that higher-order reasons are of a special kind 
and  cannot  be  compared  to  first-order  reasons.  Let’s  call  this  the  argument  from 
incommensurability, as in the following:
Incommensurability. Epistemic reasons to believe P and epistemic reasons concerning what one 
has sufficient reason to believe are incommensurable. In such a case, the balance of epistemic 
reasons to believe P differs from the balance of reasons for believing that one has sufficient 
epistemic reason to believe P.
Here is another way to put it. Let’s suppose that first-order reasons are always commensurable 
with higher-order reasons. In view of the foregoing, reasons to believe that there are reasons to 
believe P are reasons for believing P, and reasons for believing P are reasons to believe that there 
are reasons to believe P. So, in a case like Bad Reasoning, Watson should not judge that he has 
two distinct sets of epistemic reasons (one set of epistemic reasons concerning P and one set of 
epistemic reasons concerning whether it is rational to conclude that P). He should consider that 
Holmes’s  claim that  he made a mistake in processing his epistemic reasons is  a new reason 
affecting (to a certain degree)  his conclusion that  Jack the Ripper is guilty.15 But now, suppose 
that Holmes’s testimony is not a reason against the conclusion that Jack the Ripper is guilty, but 
only a reason to believe that such a conclusion is not supported by epistemic reasons.16 In such a 
case, sufficient epistemic reasons could lead to level-splitting. Thus if Incommensurability is true, 
we would learn something from cases like Bad Reasoning. Indeed, from Watson’s perspective, 
Holmes’s testimony could be sufficient evidence to draw a higher-order conclusion, while the 
various pieces of evidence he gathered could lead him to conclude that Jack the Ripper is the 
killer. Each type of epistemic reasons could play distinct roles. 
Following many others,  I  find the  Incommensurability  argument  highly  implausible.17 
Indeed, suppose that there are cases where higher-order epistemic reasons are not commensurable 
15 There is ample debate on how much weight Watson should give to Holmes’s testimony. This issue is related to 
recent works on conciliationism in cases of peer disagreement. For arguments in favour of conciliationism, see 
Christensen  (2014) and Feldman  (2005). For arguments in favour of the steadfast view, see Kelly  (2005) and 
Schoenfield (2014). See Christensen (2009) for an overview of the debate.
16 Coates (2012) endorses such a view.
17 See notably Horowitz (2014a, sec. 3) and Littlejohn (2015, sec. 5). 
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with  reasons for  believing P or  against  believing P.  Now, let’s  assume that  an agent  has  an 
infallible reason to believe that he or she has sufficient reason to believe P  and an infallible 
reason  against  believing  P.  Such  a  situation  would  not  be  impossible,  since  the 
incommensurability argument implies that higher-order epistemic reasons and first-order reasons 
can be of a different kind. So, an epistemically rational agent could be perfectly confident that he 
or she has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P, but also be perfectly confident that P is false.  
As Horowitz rightly stresses, the agent would conclude that whether P and whether he or she has 
epistemic reasons to believe P are entirely separate issues, which appears nonsensical (Horowitz 
2014a, 726). Specifically, it is highly implausible that, in some cases, reasons to believe that there 
are reasons to believe P does not even have the slightest impact on reasons to believe P. 
2.2. Level-Splitting and Fallible Reasons
If reasons for believing P and reasons for believing that there are reasons for believing P 
are  commensurable,  this  means  that  higher-order  reasons  can  somehow  count  as  first-order 
reasons. In such a context, the denial of Incommensurability paves the way for various principles 
connecting higher-order reasons and first-order reasons. Nevertheless, such principles could be 
correct while cases of level-splitting are possible.18 So, there must be another explanation of why 
first-order reasons and higher-order reasons can come apart.
A second explanation of why there could be cases of level-splitting is that higher-order 
epistemic reasons are  fallible. We can imagine how higher-order fallible reasons can open the 
door to cases of level-splitting, as in the following:
Higher-Order Fallibilism.  One can have  fallible sufficient reason for believing that one has 
sufficient reason to believe P. In a case where such a reason is misleading, it is possible that 
one is rational to conclude that he or she has sufficient epistemic reason to believe P while 
lacking sufficient reason for the belief that P. 
18 As I  will  explain  in  section  3.2  and  3.4,  Lasonen-Aarnio  (2015,  169)  argues  that  the  Rational  Reflection  
principle, which roughly states that an agent’s rational expectations of the rational credence in P constrains his or  
her rational credence in P, can lead to rational epistemic akrasia (see also Elga (2013) on the Rational Reflection 
principle). However, this principle presupposes that whether P and whether there are epistemic reasons to believe 
P  are  not  separate  issues.  So,  even  if  we  admit  that  higher-order  reasons  and  first-order  reasons  are  
commensurable, this doesn’t seem sufficient to rule out the possibility of level-splitting.
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Suppose that an agent has fallible reasons for believing that he or she has sufficient reason to  
believe P. If higher-order reasons are fallible, having sufficient reason for believing that one has 
sufficient reason to believe P does not entail  the conclusion that one has sufficient reason to 
believe P, since these reasons could be misleading. So, it is possible that fallible higher-order 
reasons lead to level-splitting. It seems that Rational Puzzle could be explained by Higher-Order 
Fallibilism, since one could be rational to believe that he or she has sufficient epistemic reason to 
believe P while not believing P (either by withholding judgment on whether P or by disbelieving 
P).
If  Higher-Order  Fallibilism is  true,  we  will  learn  something  from cases  like  Fallible 
Reasons. Suppose that Watson believes that he has sufficient reason to conclude that Jack the 
Ripper  is  the  killer.  Watson’s  belief  can  be  based  on  sufficient  epistemic  reasons,  but  not 
necessarily on infallible epistemic reasons. While such a belief can be rational, it could be based 
on fallible and misleading reasons. This means that Watson could lack sufficient reasons to draw 
the conclusion that Jack the Ripper is the killer. In such a context, Watson would be rational not 
to conclude that Jack the Ripper is the killer.
It seems that, apart from Incommensurability and Higher-Order Fallibilism, there is no 
third possible explanation of why Rational Puzzle holds. Indeed, if higher-order sufficient reasons 
are infallible, having sufficient reason for believing that one has sufficient reason to believe P 
means that one inevitably has sufficient reason to believe P, and so there cannot be cases of level-
splitting. Consequently, if Rational Puzzle holds, the culprit is Higher-Order Fallibilism. 
3. Higher-Order Fallibilism
In this section, I start by suggesting that Rational Puzzle is closely related to other well-
known issues concerning fallible reasons. We cannot give a definitive answer to Rational Puzzle 
without solving traditional problems of responding to fallible reasons, such as the lottery paradox. 
However, I will argue that, under one interpretation of higher-order reasons, there is no obstacle 
to  eliminating  higher-order  fallible  reasons.  My  argument  relies  on  the  probabilistic 
representation of reasons introduced in section 1.1 and can be roughly summarized as follows: 
(1) There can be cases of level-splitting only if agents respond to higher-order fallible reasons.
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(2) Relative to the probabilistic representation of reasons, higher-order fallible reasons can be 
represented as conditional probabilities and higher-order infallible reasons can be represented 
as unconditional probabilities.
(3) But conditional probabilities can be replaced by unconditional probabilities.
(4) So, relative to the probabilistic representation of reasons, fallible higher-order reasons can be 
replaced  by  infallible  higher-order  reasons,  and  agents  can  avoid  responding  to  fallible 
higher-order reasons.
(C) So,  relative  to  the  probabilistic  representation  of  reasons,  cases  of  level-splitting  can  be 
avoided.
Consequently, there is no reason why a rational agent would necessarily have to choose between 
satisfying  Reasons-Responsiveness  and  satisfying  Reasons  Enkrasia.  Furthermore,  it  seems 
plausible that a rational agent would prefer to ground his or her beliefs concerning what he or she 
has sufficient reason to believe on infallible reasons. In summary, I do not rule out the possibility 
that a rational agent can maintain an akratic combination of attitudes while responding correctly 
to his or her epistemic reasons, but I claim that this would be an odd preference.
3.1. Canonical Problems Related to Responding to Fallible Reasons
The possibility of responding correctly to fallible reasons is problematic. On one hand, it 
seems perfectly plausible that rational beliefs are sometimes false  (Greco 2014, 203). It seems 
that an agent can be rational in believing P when P’s epistemic probability is smaller than 1. For 
example, if one is certain that P has 0.95 chance (or any other high but imperfect threshold) of 
obtaining, then one is rationally permitted to believe P. On the other hand, responding to fallible 
reasons leads  to numerous puzzles.  Specifically,  rational  reasoning should have some logical 
properties, such that if you reason correctly from rational attitudes, your conclusion should also 
be rational. These two demands sometimes conflict, as in the following examples:
Lottery. Imagine a lottery with a sufficiently high number of tickets. Only one ticket is a winner. 
Each ticket is equally likely to win. Since the probability that each ticket will lose is more 
than 0.95 (or any other probability that you like), an agent should rationally believe that each 
ticket is a loser. Indeed, the agent’s beliefs concerning chances of winning reflect his or her 
knowledge of the objective probabilities. However, it is rational to believe that one ticket will 
win. So, one should believe that each ticket is a loser and that one ticket is a winner, which is  
inconsistent.
Cheap Justification. Imagine that the sufficient threshold for believing any proposition is 0.95. 
An agent rationally believes that there is a 0.96 chance that there is a 0.96 chance that P (and 
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a 0.04 chance that there is 0 chance that P). Indeed, the agent’s rational beliefs concerning 
chances  reflect  his  or  her  knowledge  of  the  objective  probabilities.  Since  the  sufficient 
threshold for believing a proposition is 0.95, the agent then comes to the conclusion that there 
is  a  0.96 chance that  P (since,  from the agent’s  perspective,  such a  proposition has  0.96 
chance  of  obtaining).  The  agent  then  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  P,  since  (again)  the 
sufficient threshold for believing a proposition is 0.95. However, since 0.92 is equivalent to 
≈0.96·0.96, the agent is irrational in believing P (since 0.92≤0.95).19 So, one is rationally 
prohibited from believing that P, but can still manage to identify a justificatory chain to the 
conclusion that P, which is nonsensical.
Various solutions to cases like Lottery and Cheap Justification have been suggested. A 
first  solution  is  to  argue  that  sufficient  reasons  are  infallible  (or  may  not  saliently  appear 
fallible).20 An agent can rationally believe that P only if, relative to his or her evidence, P could 
not be false. In cases like Lottery, such a solution prohibits a rational agent from believing that 
each  ticket  is  a  loser,  since  it  is  possible  that  one  ticket  is  a  winner.  In  cases  like  Cheap 
Justification, if P is uncertain, no infallible justificatory chain leading to the conclusion that P can 
be identified, since some “residual” uncertainty will remain in any justificatory chain.
Another  solution  is  to  argue  that  rational  beliefs  do  not  necessarily  ground  rational 
reasoning.21 While  P and Q logically  imply  (P^Q),  rationally  believing that  P and rationally 
19 At least  in some situations, such an equivalence is correct. Imagine that an agent is about to roll two dice and 
that there is 0.92 chance that he or she will not roll a six twice. However, he or she could consider that there are  
two probabilities here (one for the first die and one for the second). The agent could believe that there is a 0.96 
chance that there is a 0.96 chance that he or she will not roll a six twice. Formally, there are different ways to  
understand this equivalence, but here is a straightforward one. Since P(B)·P(C|B) amounts to P(B^C), it suffices 
to say that A=(B^C) for it to be rationally permitted to replace P(A) with P(B)·P(C|B). For example, if P(B)·P(C|
B)=0.92, P(B)≈0.96, and A=(B^C), then it is correct to conclude that P(A)≈0.96·0.96. See also Worsnip (m.s., 
sec. 2) on a similar problem.
20 See Littlejohn, who argues that there are no justified false beliefs (Littlejohn 2012, 99–102, 121–27). It should 
be noted that this solution does not exclude degrees of beliefs. Probabilism, for example, is compatible with this 
view. Under some interpretations of probabilism, a credence is just a percentage of certainty  (Sturgeon 2008, 
162, n.1). Also, the saliency condition can be interpreted in different ways. Clarke  (2013) argues that, while 
rationally believing P is having a rational credence of 1 in P, rational credences are determined by alternative  
possibilities one entertains.  Leitgeb  (2014) defends the claim that  an agent's  rational  credence in P and the 
partitioning of possibilities he or she entertains determine the sufficient threshold for believing P. In a lottery  
case where an agent has rational attitudes concerning every ticket, this solution amounts to fixing the sufficient 
threshold for believing that “ticket n will lose” at 1.
21 Demey (2013), Foley (2009) and Sturgeon (2008) reject closure under conjunction and argue that while agents 
can rationally believe P and rationally believe Q, it can be rational for them to withhold judgment or disbelieve  
(P^Q). Kroedel (2011) argues that epistemic justification has to do with permissibility, and that since permissions 
do not agglomerate (being permitted to drink and being permitted to drive does not imply that one is permitted to 
drink  and drive  simultaneously),  rationally  believing  P and  rationally  believing  Q do  not  agglomerate  and 
warrant  the  rational  conclusion  that  (P^Q).  Relatedly,  Easwaran  and  Fitelson  (2015) argue  that,  from  an 
accuracy-centered  perspective,  it  can  be  rational  to  believe  P and  to  believe  Q,  but  to  disbelieve  (P^Q).  
Specifically, believing P, believing Q and disbelieving (P^Q) can maximize expected accuracy.
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believing that Q are not necessarily sufficient for rationally concluding that (P^Q). In cases like 
Lottery, this solution implies that, while I rationally believe that ticket 1 is a loser, that ticket 2 is 
a loser and so forth, I am not rationally permitted to believe that (ticket 1 is a loser and ticket 2 is 
a loser and... ticket n is a loser). In fact, this solution to Lottery entails the denial of Intra-Level 
Coherence,  which  roughly  states  that  if  an  epistemically  rational  agent  believes  that  P and 
believes that Q, it is false that he or she believes that ~(P^Q). In cases like Cheap Justification, I 
may rationally believe that there is a high chance that P, but that does not necessarily entail the 
rational conclusion that P, since my belief that there is a high chance that P is based on fallible 
reasons.
3.2. Rational Puzzle and Fallible Reasons
The above analysis of fallible reasons sheds light on Rational Puzzle. Let’s assume for a 
moment that the first solution to Lottery and Cheap Justification is correct and that sufficient 
reasons are infallible. This would solve Rational Puzzle, since rational agents would be required 
to respond only to  infallible reasons. Having sufficient reason to believe that one has  sufficient 
reason to believe P would amount to having  infallible reason to believe that one has  infallible 
reason to believe P, which would necessarily secure the rational conclusion that P. Thus, there 
could never be sufficient reason to believe that one has sufficient reason to believe P without 
there being sufficient reason to believe P.
Now, let’s assume that the second solution to Lottery and Cheap Justification is correct, 
and so that rational beliefs do not necessarily ground rational reasoning. In such a context, the 
incoherentist  solution to  Rational  Puzzle  would then be correct.  According to  incoherentism, 
Reasons Enkrasia is not a genuine rationality requirement, since one can be rational in believing 
that one has sufficient reason to believe P, while not believing that P. Consider cases like Cheap 
Justification. One is rational in believing that there is a 0.96 chance that P. A 0.95 chance that P 
would constitute a sufficient reason to believe P. Nevertheless, it would be irrational for him or 
her to believe P, since relative to that agent’s epistemic reasons, P has a 0.92 chance of being the 
case.  Interestingly,  some of Lasonen-Aarnio’s  examples  in  favour  of  the conflict  between an 
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agent’s rational expectations of the rational credence in P and enkratic requirements are very 
close to cases like Cheap Justification, as she indicates in the following:
Assume that the threshold for belief is 0.9, and that you know this. Assume that you 
have the following rational credences: your credence that the rational credence in p is 
0.89 is 0.9, and your credence that the rational credence in p is 0.99 is 0.1. Then, your 
expectation of the rational credence is 0.9.... Given the 0.9 threshold for belief, you 
believe p. But you also believe that it is not rational to believe p. Hence, you are in a 
state of epistemic akrasia (Lasonen-Aarnio 2015, 169).22
Offering a full solution to Rational Puzzle boils down to determining the constraints on 
responding to fallible reasons. Rather than being a brand new puzzle, Rational Puzzle seems to be 
a consequence of latent issues concerning fallible reasons. If sufficient reasons are infallible, then 
there  cannot  be  a  dilemma  between  Reasons  Enkrasia  and  Reasons-Responsiveness.  But  if 
rational beliefs do not necessarily ground rational reasoning, then Reasons Enkrasia could not be 
a  genuine  rationality  requirement.  Thus,  as  long  as  we  do  not  have  a  clear  picture  of  the 
constraints limiting how agents respond to fallible reasons, we will not be in a position to give a 
full  answer  to  Rational  Puzzle,  since  Reasons  Enkrasia  could  not  be  a  genuine  rationality 
requirement.
3.3. The Possibility of Always Responding to Higher-Order Infallible Reasons
Let’s now assume that the rational status of Reasons Enkrasia is uncertain and that we 
cannot give a full answer to Rational Puzzle. In view of the foregoing, what are we in a position  
to defend? I previously argued that if all higher-order reasons are infallible, then there cannot be 
cases of level-splitting. This means that there are two ways to offer a partial solution to Rational 
Puzzle, as in the following:
(1) While  there  are  first-order  fallible  reasons,  higher-order  reasons  concerning  facts  about 
reasons or rationality are infallible.23
22 Elsewhere, she offers another example close to Cheap Justification: “Assume, for instance, that p is sufficiently 
likely, and it is only likely to degree 0.3 that p is not sufficiently likely (and hence, likely to degree 0.7 that p is 
sufficiently likely). Nevertheless, one has misleading evidence about how likely it is that  p is not sufficiently 
likely: in fact, it is very likely (say to degree 0.95) that it is likely that p is not sufficiently likely.... For all that 
has been said, the belief  that she is not rationally permitted to believe p can satisfy the entirety of the above 
condition” (Lasonen-Aarnio m.s., 5).
23 This view is very close to Titelbaum’s (2015) Fixed Point thesis, which roughly states that mistakes concerning 
the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality. However, Titelbaum’s Fixed Point thesis relies on the 
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(2) While it  is  possible for an epistemically rational agent to respond to higher-order  fallible 
reasons, he or she is always in a position to respond to higher-order infallible reasons.
I will now provide an argument for (2), the claim that an agent is always in a position to respond 
to higher-order infallible reasons. This provides a partial solution to Rational Puzzle, since if one 
can avoid responding to higher-order fallible reasons, then one is always in a position to satisfy 
both Reasons Enkrasia and Reasons-Responsiveness.
I previously assumed that epistemic reasons warrant  epistemic probabilities, understood 
as the probabilities warranted by an agent’s body of epistemic reasons. With respect to Rational 
Puzzle, we can learn something from such a representation of reasons.
There are two main types of probability assessments—namely, conditional probabilities 
and  unconditional  probabilities.  In  other  words,  we  can  wonder  what  P’s  unconditional 
probability is, but we can also wonder what P’s probability is on the condition that some states of 
affair (Q, R, S...) obtain.24 Relative to the probabilistic representation of reasons, fallible higher-
order reasons can be represented by conditional epistemic probabilities. If the probability that 
[P’s probability is 0.9] is 0.9, then P’s probability is 0.9 on the condition that Q obtains, and Q’s  
probability is 0.9. In such a case, it could be false that P’s probability is 0.9, since such a claim is 
conditional  on  Q  obtaining,  and  Q  is  uncertain.  By  way  of  contrast,  infallible  higher-order 
reasons  can  be  represented  by  unconditional  epistemic  probabilities.  If  it  is  certain  that  P’s 
probability is 0.9, then such an evaluation of P’s probability is not conditional on some merely 
probable event Q obtaining.
One reason why it seems appropriate to represent higher-order reasons by conditional and 
unconditional  epistemic  probabilities  is  that  such  a  representation  is  compatible  with  the 
Commensurability constraint discussed in section 2 (according to such a constraint, higher-order 
premise that akrasia is irrational (Titelbaum 2015, 254), an assumption that I question in this paper. Also, the  
claim that mistakes concerning the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality is compatible with the 
rejection of Reasons-Responsiveness. Consider the following argument: (1) Rational agents cannot be mistaken 
concerning what rationality requires of them; (2) however, in responding correctly to their reasons, agents can 
form rational false beliefs concerning what they sufficient reason to believe; (C) so, responding correctly to  
reasons an agent has is not a genuine requirement of rationality, or claims concerning Reasons-Responsiveness 
are outside the realm of rationality. For these reasons, I will not explore Titelbaum’s line of reasoning here.  
However, I acknowledge that exploring such a line of reasoning could eventually solve Rational Puzzle.
24 We could also say that an unconditional probability is a probability conditional on a necessarily true event or  
proposition. For example, if (Bv~B) is necessarily true, then P(A)=P(A|(Bv~B)).
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reasons can count as first-order reasons). Here is why. Suppose that P’s epistemic probability is 
0.9 on the condition that Q obtains and that P’s epistemic probability is 0 on the condition that ~Q 
obtains. In such a context P’s probability will vary depending on Q’s obtaining. In particular, if Q 
were certain, this would entail that P’s probability is 0.9. Similarly, if ~Q were certain, this would 
entail  that  P’s  probability  is  0.  As  we  can  see,  the  existence  of  reasons  for  or  against  the 
conclusion that Q can affect the probability of first-order conclusions such as P. Since epistemic 
reasons are represented by epistemic probabilities, we can conclude that acquiring higher-order 
epistemic  reasons  can  somehow  count  as  acquiring  first-order  reasons.  Hence,  the 
Commensurability condition discussed in section 2 is satisfied.
Here is the trick: as long as chains of conditional probabilities end with an unconditional 
probability,  a  conditional  probability  can  be  replaced  by  an  unconditional  probability.  For 
example, if the epistemic probability that [the epistemic probability that P is 0.9] is 0.9 and the 
epistemic probability that [the epistemic probability that P is 0] is 0.1, it is possible to determine 
P’s  unconditional  epistemic  probability.  For  example,  in  this  specific  case,  P’s  unconditional 
epistemic  probability  would  be  0.81.25 In  other  words,  the  epistemic  probability  that  [the 
epistemic probability that P is 0.81] is 1. Now, recall that infallible higher-order reasons can be 
represented by unconditional epistemic probabilities. This means that, all things being equal, we 
can pass from higher-order fallible reasons (as represented by conditional epistemic probabilities) 
to higher-order infallible reasons (as represented by unconditional epistemic probabilities). That 
is,  the  same body of  epistemic  reasons can  be  understood as  providing higher-order  fallible 
reasons and higher-order infallible reasons.
We  can  move  from  conditional  epistemic  probabilities  to  unconditional  epistemic 
probabilities as long as chains of conditional probabilities end with an unconditional probability. 
What about the cases where P’s epistemic probability is infinitely conditional? For example, there 
25 We can express such a result formally. Suppose that, conditional on A, P’s probability is X, but conditional on  
~A, P’s probability is Y. Conditions A and ~A are also merely probable. Let’s assume that P(P|A)=X, P(P|~A)=Y, 
P(A)=C and P(~A)=(1-C). In such a context, we can determine P’s conditional probability, but we can also 
determine  P’s  unconditional probability.  Indeed, P(J)=P(J^K)+P(J^~K) and P(J^K)=P(K)·P(J|K) are familiar 
probability rules.  Since  P(J^K)=P(K)·P(J|K), we can conclude that  X·C=P(P^A) and  Y·(1-C)=P(P^~A). Since 
P(J)=P(J^K)+P(J^~K),  we  can  conclude  that  P(P)=(Y·(1-C))+(X·C).  In  the  situation  described,  since  P(P|
A)=0.9, P(P|~A)=0, P(A)=0.9 and P(~A)=0.1, we get the result that P(P)=(0·0.1)+(0.9·0.9)=0.81. Hence, at least 
in the situation described, combinations of conditional probabilities can be replaced by an unconditional one.
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could be cases where P’s probability is conditional on Q, and that Q is conditional on R, and that 
such a regress does not stop with a “final” unconditional probability. Even in such situations, 
there is a modest sense in which we can move from higher-order fallible reasons to higher-order 
infallible reasons. Indeed, imagine that P’s probability is determined by the following series:26
P(P)= P(A1) - P(A2) - P(A3) ... - P(An), where P(An)=0.9·(101-n) and n tends to infinity.
If P(P)= ∑ 0.9 - 0.9·0.1 ... - 0.9·(101-n), P(P) converges to 0.8.
As we can see, P’s probability is here defined by an infinite series of merely probable events, but 
still converges to 0.8. The lesson here is that while P’s probability is conditional on a series of 
merely probable events, there is a modest sense in which we can determine P’s unconditional 
probability, since P’s unconditional probability converges to 0.8. If such an infinite probabilistic 
chain converges,  then there is  a  modest sense in  which P’s  unconditional  probability  can be 
determined.27
This is an important step toward solving Rational Puzzle. Relative to the probabilistic 
representation  of  reasons,  higher-order  fallible  reasons  can  be  represented  by  conditional 
epistemic probabilities and higher-order infallible reasons can be represented by unconditional 
epistemic  probabilities.  Since  conditional  probabilities  can  be  replaced  by  an  unconditional 
probability, fallible higher-order reasons can be replaced by infallible higher-order reasons, and 
so it is rational for agents to avoid responding to fallible higher-order reasons. In such a context, 
there is  no specific  reason why it  would  be necessary for  agents  to  respond to higher-order 
fallible reasons.  Furthermore,  if  agents can avoid responding to higher-order fallible  reasons, 
cases of level-splitting can also be avoided. This provides a partial solution to Rational Puzzle.
3.4. A Step Further: The Conflict Between the Rational Reflection Principle and Enkrasia
The argument I just offered can shed light on the putative conflict between the Rational 
Reflection principle and enkratic requirements. The Rational Reflection principle roughly states 
that an agent’s rational expectations of the rational credence in P constrains his or her rational 
credence  in  P.  Lasonen-Aarnio  (2015,  169)  claims  that  satisfying  the  Rational  Reflection 
26 This example is largely inspired by Atkinson and Peijnenburg’s (2006; 2009) result that an infinite probabilistic 
chain can ground P’s probability.
27 For the sake of simplicity, I here limit myself to cases where an infinite chain of conditional probabilities is 
represented by a convergent series, not a divergent one.
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principle  can  lead  to  forming  akratic  combinations  of  attitudes.  This  is  so  because  one  can 
rationally  believe  P while  rationally  believing  that  one’s  own  belief  is  irrational,  as  in  the 
following line of reasoning:
(1) It is rational for A to believe P if and only if A has a rational credence of at least 0.9 in P.
(2) The rational credence that [the rational credence in P is 0.89] is 0.9, and the rational credence 
that [the rational credence in P is 0.99] is 0.1.
(3) Following  the  Rational  Reflection  principle,  Cr(P)=(0.99·0.1)+(0.89·0.9)=0.9,  and  so  A 
rationally believes P.
(4) But the credence in [the rational credence in P is 0.89] is 0.9. So, A rationally believes that the 
rational credence in P is 0.89 and that believing P is irrational.
However, Lasonen-Aarnio assumes that credence assignments are rational only insofar as they 
track (or reflect) epistemic probabilities (Lasonen-Aarnio m.s., 2). This means that, in the above 
situation, the epistemic probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.89] is 0.9 and the epistemic 
probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.99] is 0.1. Now, if the epistemic probability that 
[P’s  epistemic  probability  is  0.89]  is  0.9,  this  means  that  P’s  epistemic  probability  is  0.89 
conditional on an  event  Q  obtaining,  and  Q’s  epistemic  probability  is  0.9.  Similarly,  if  the 
epistemic probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.99] is 0.1, this means that P’s epistemic 
probability is 0.99 conditional on an event Q not obtaining, and ~Q’s epistemic probability is 0.1. 
Finally, we can use P’s conditional probabilities to calculate P’s unconditional probability. In the 
above case, P’s unconditional epistemic probability is 0.9 (since (0.89·0.9)+(0.99·0.1)=0.9). This 
means that the epistemic probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.9] is 1.
Now, recall that infallible higher-order reasons are represented by unconditional epistemic 
probabilities. In such a context, since 0.9 is P’s unconditional epistemic probability, it would be 
rational for an agent to be certain that 0.9 is the rational credence in P. In other words, he or she 
has an infallible reason to conclude that 0.9 is the rational credence in P, and so being certain that 
0.9 is the rational credence in P would be an appropriate response to his or her epistemic reasons. 
There is no need for the agent to believe that such a credence assignment is irrational relative to 
his or her epistemic reasons. The agent has all the information required not to be mistaken about 
his or her own epistemic rationality.
Here is another way to put it. In the described case, an agent’s rational credences can track 
the following epistemic probabilities: the epistemic probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 
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0.89] is 0.9 and the epistemic probability that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.99] is 0.1. As long as 
sufficient reasons can be fallible,  tracking these epistemic probabilities can lead to a conflict 
between  the  Rational  Reflection  principle  and  enkratic  requirements.  However,  an  agent’s 
rational credences can also track the following epistemic probability: the epistemic probability 
that [P’s epistemic probability is 0.9] is 1. If the agent’s rational credences track this epistemic 
probability, we get the following result:
(5) It is rational for A to believe P if and only if A has a rational credence of at least 0.9 in P.
(6) The rational credence that [the rational credence in P is 0.9] is 1.
(7) Following the Rational Reflection principle, Cr(P)=(0.9·1)=0.9, and so A rationally believes 
P.
(8) Since  the  credence  in  [the  rational  credence  in  P is  0.9]  is  1,  A rationally  believes  that 
believing P is rational.
As we can see, when tracking higher-order infallible reasons  (as represented by unconditional 
epistemic probabilities), the Rational Reflection principle does not lead to forming an akratic 
combination of beliefs.
Now, perhaps we should not accept the Rational Reflection principle (Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2015) ultimately rejects such a principle). I am not defending such a principle here. What I wish 
to stress is that, when taking the possibility of responding to higher-order infallible reasons into 
account, the conflict between the Rational Reflection principle and enkratic requirements is a lot 
less clear. Surely, when agents respond to higher-order fallible reasons, the Rational Reflection 
principle can conflict with enkratic requirements. However, as long as it is possible for the agent 
to avoid responding to higher-order fallible reasons (which is always the case), such a conflict is 
resolved.
3.5. The Relevance of Responding to Higher-Order Infallible Reasons
If agents are always in a position to respond to higher-order infallible reasons, this means 
that, minimally, it is  always possible to simultaneously satisfy Reasons Enkrasia and Reasons-
Responsiveness. I will now go a step further and suggest that rational agents prefer responding to 
infallible  higher-order  reasons.  While  this  will  not  prove that  Reasons Enkrasia  is  a  genuine 
rationality  requirement,  such an  argument  will  make  it  plausible that  Reasons  Enkrasia  is  a 
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requirement of rationality,  since an agent would have no reason to entertain an epistemically 
akratic combination of attitudes.
Responding to higher-order infallible reasons provides a better answer to cases like Cheap 
Justification. Recall that, in Cheap Justification, an agent rationally believes that there is a 0.96 
chance that there is a 0.96 chance that P (and a 0.04 chance that there is 0 chance that P), and 
such  rational  beliefs  concerning  chances  reflect  his  or  her  knowledge  of  the  objective 
probabilities.  If cases like Cheap Justification support incoherentism, it must be admitted that a 
rational agent can frequently figure out a misleading chain of justification in favour of numerous 
higher-order beliefs concerning sufficient reasons. For example, in some situations where I know 
that P’s objective probability is 0.75, I could believe that there is a ≈0.87 chance that there is a 
≈0.87 chance that P, since 0.75 is equivalent to ≈0.87·0.87.28 Assuming that 0.85 is a sufficient 
probabilistic threshold, I could then come to the conclusion that there is a ≈0.87 chance that P. 
But there’s something quite wrong with such a result.  I take it as a datum that no rational agent 
would  want  to  have  such  a  misleading  justificatory  chain  of  attitudes  concerning  sufficient 
reasons. Plausibly, if I know that P’s objective probability is 0.75, I am better off believing that 
there is a 0.75 chance that P, and this seems best explained by the fact that I should respond to 
infallible higher-order reasons.
Here is another way to understand my point. Allowing fallible higher-order reasons can 
lead to patently strange situations that no rational agent would want to be in (especially since they 
can easily be avoided). Consider the following conversation:
Watson: What are the odds that Jack the Ripper did it?
Holmes: You may rationally believe that there is a ≈0.87 chance that Jack the Ripper did it.
Watson: Why would it be rational for me to believe that there is a ≈0.87 chance that Jack the 
Ripper is guilty?
Holmes: Well, let’s see. Undoubtedly, there is a 0.75 chance that Jack the Ripper did it, but in this 
specific case there is a ≈0.87 chance that there is a ≈0.87 chance that Jack the Ripper did it 
(and a 0.13 chance that there is 0 chance that Jack the Ripper did it). The sufficient threshold 
for  rationally  believing a  proposition  is  0.85.  In  such a  context,  it  is  rational  for  you to 
conclude that there is a ≈0.87 chance that Jack the Ripper is guilty.
Watson: Okay, and so following the same explanation you just provided, I am also rational in 
concluding that Jack the Ripper did it.
28 See note 19.
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Holmes: No! Your belief that there is a ≈0.87 chance that Jack the Ripper did it is not a sufficient 
reason for believing that Jack the Ripper did it.  You see, since there is no doubt that the 
objective probability that Jack the Ripper did it is 0.75, you are not permitted to believe that  
Jack the Ripper is the killer.
Watson: Oh, so you first gave me information from which I cannot rationally reason, but you had 
information from which I could reason. You gave me a sufficient reason to believe something 
from which I could badly reason.
Holmes: Exactly!
What do we learn from the above conversation? Even if we assume that Watson did not 
violate any rule of rationality in believing that there is a ≈0.87 chance that P, it is patently clear to 
him that, in believing that there is a 0.75 chance that P, he has access to a more informative and  
useful way to reason. Believing that there is a 0.75 chance that P would ground correct reasoning, 
while believing that there is a ≈0.87 chance that P will not. Also, while Holmes is not making any 
rational mistake in presenting the chances differently, there is a better way for him to inform 
Watson of P’s likelihood. Thus, in situations where fallible reasons concerning what is probable 
can be replaced with infallible reasons concerning what is probable, the latter appears preferable.
In summary, since beliefs concerning sufficient reasons often aim at reasoning correctly, a 
rational  agent  would  prefer  responding  to  infallible  reasons  concerning  what  he  or  she  has 
sufficient  reason  to  believe.  Furthermore,  there  seems  to  be  no  structural  obstacle  to  avoid 
responding to higher-order fallible reasons. In such a context, it is possible that an epistemically 
akratic combination of attitudes is rational, but the higher-order belief  that one has sufficient 
reason to believe P would play no role in an agent’s reasoning (or a potentially misleading role). 
Even if, strictly speaking, it would not be irrational to respond to fallible higher-order reasons, I 
see no reason why an agent would prefer responding to fallible higher-order reasons.
4. Conclusion and Discussion
This  paper  offers  a  partial  solution  to  Rational  Puzzle,  the  view that  either  Reasons-
Responsiveness or Reasons Enkrasia (or possibly both) are not genuine rationality requirements. I 
first argued that  Rational Puzzle holds only if level-splitting can be rational—that is, only if a 
rational agent can have sufficient epistemic reason to conclude that “he or she has sufficient 
epistemic reason to believe P,” while having sufficient epistemic reason against believing P. I then 
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explained why level-splitting is possible only if higher-order epistemic reasons are sometimes 
fallible and misleading.
Since an agent is always in a position to respond to higher-order infallible reasons, he or 
she  never  has  to  choose  between  satisfying  Reasons-Responsiveness  and  Reasons  Enkrasia. 
Furthermore,  since  reasoning  from  infallible  higher-order  reasons  appears  preferable  to  an 
epistemically rational reasoner, I see no reason why an agent would reason from fallible higher-
order reasons and end up with an akratic combination of attitudes. This is why I partially solved 
Rational Puzzle: I offered an argument that we can always satisfy both Reasons Enkrasia and 
Reasons-Responsiveness.
Nevertheless, Reasons Enkrasia could fail to be a genuine rationality requirement, since 
strictly speaking, I did not prove that inter-level incoherence is necessarily irrational. As I argued, 
proving that incoherence is irrational would also require solving problems such as the lottery 
paradox. This is why I did not offer a full answer to Rational Puzzle, which would include a 
principled vindication of Reasons Enkrasia and Reasons-Responsiveness.
The argument of this paper has clear limits. I assumed that a probabilistic representation 
of reasons was correct and that we could reach the same results through other theories, such as 
possibility  theory  or  ranking  theory.  But  as  I  indicated  in  section  1.1,  the  probabilistic 
representation of reasons raises methodological difficulties. Also, assuming such an equivalence 
between  representations  of  fallible  reasons  will  be  unsatisfactory  to  many  philosophers.  We 
should either prove that the results of this paper can be reached through any representation of 
reasons or adapt the argument to other frameworks.
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